Apollo 1: 53 Minutes of the Crew, Six Weeks Before the Fire - and What the Board Found

▸ Cape Kennedy, Florida — sunrise ▸ A NASA recording. The room is being set up. Okay, can you see him, who's he came down to, can you see him? Okay, for transcript purposes, we'll go through the introductions, starting from ▸ APOLLO 1 - Six weeks before the fire, they answered questions for 53 minutes ▸ The men being introduced are the crew of the first manned Apollo flight your right, Donald Slayton, next to him, Mr.

Walter Cunningham, the LM pilot, I guess, now on the backup crew, Mr. Don Eisele, or Major, pardon, oh, they haven't changed the designation on this crew. ▸ Slayton names the backup crew first: Schirra, Eisele, Cunningham Mr. Walt Cunningham is the pilot, Major Don Eisele the senior pilot, Captain Wally Schirra the command pilot of the backup crew, Lieutenant Commander Roger Chaffee the ▸ Virgil Grissom · Edward White II · Roger Chaffee — the prime crew pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Ed White the senior pilot, and Lieutenant Colonel Virgil Grissom the command pilot of the prime crew.

Colonel Grissom will start off with a few words on their training. ▸ In about six weeks all three of them will be dead Well, we really have been doing too much different than we have been for the past six months, I guess, since the last time we saw at least part of you out in Los Angeles. ▸ ONE - TRAINING We've been doing the major portion of our training at the North American plant in ▸ North American Aviation, Downey, California — Command Module 012 Downey on the ME012 evaluator, which consists primarily of the guidance navigation system. Our trainer at the CAPE, our AMS, which is just now getting in real good ▸ The trainer at the Cape had only just come into good shape shape for us to start using and we'll start using it as our primary trainer after the first of the year.

As far as the spacecraft is concerned, it's been, we thought ▸ They had thought the spacecraft was well checked out when it left Los Angeles we had it pretty well checked out at left Los Angeles and we've run into some ▸ The environmental control system had given trouble. It had just been fixed. problems in the environmental control system which have just been corrected and we'll start back with the altitude chamber test the first of the year at the Cape. ▸ The altitude chamber test would be restarted after the first of the year I guess the biggest thing that's happened to us since that time was the change of ▸ And the backup crew had just been changed under them backup crew.

As you know, they've just been introduced with Wally and Don and Walt. This has caused us some little problem in that they were somewhat behind us in training, so they have been scrambling pretty hard to get caught up. Also, as you know, we had individual assignments at that time, work assignments as far as the flight plan was concerned, mission rules, objectives, flight objectives, this sort of thing. Well obviously Wally and his crew didn't have time to pick up those things and fortunately most of them were pretty well done anyway and well along the way so we've actually picked up three other pilots to help us with this who aren't here today maybe they should have been but we have Ed Gibbons and Jack Swigert and and Ron Evans, who are helping us in this area and doing a lot of, I guess, really sort of dog work for us, but they are doing a great job for us.

I have about a three or four minute film, I understand it, I'll try to narrate for ▸ He has a three or four minute film to show the room you, and then we'll open it up for questions for you. Let's get one of those monitors to the family room. Let's do the model up here, I guess. Good boy.

▸ TWO - THE HATCH Oh, I'll go the other way. Oh, this is Oh, the model's out of the way. ▸ He is running a projector. The film is water egress training.

Gonna move the model back. Uh, this is on board the, uh Uh, the repeater. We're getting ready to do the Our water survival training now is off. And this is aboard our plate.

Ed's, uh, putting the inner hatch on now, and then an ▸ "Ed's putting the inner hatch on now, and then an outer hatch goes on" outer hatch goes on. And here they are getting ready to drop, drop us in the water. Those are float bags on top. And we have changed our procedures a little bit here.

▸ Three hatches. The inner one closes the pressure vessel wall. We have one raft for all three of us, and that's Ed getting in, and Roger comes out ▸ It is the first hatch the crew opens in an unaided escape second, and then I'm the last one out. ▸ It opens inward That's Roger on his way in and then I'm, we were looking for film for you today to show to you and actually was pretty hard to come.

▸ THREE - THE CHAMBER This was a fit and functional test we had out at Downey before the spacecraft was ▸ The fit and functional test at Downey, before the spacecraft was shipped shipped. We're checking over some of the gear that will be stowed on board and how it was stowed and this sort of thing. And this is just prior to going to the altitude chamber test down at the Cape. Those are our flight suits that we have on.

And this test will have to be done over again starting the first part of January. ▸ "This test will have to be done over again starting the first part of January" That's just the entrance to the altitude chamber itself, and there's a spacecraft in ▸ The entrance to the altitude chamber, with the spacecraft inside the chamber. Those are the suits you'll be wearing, Captain? Yes, those were flight suits.

This is a TV picture taken by a camera that's mounted ▸ A NASA recording: the crew of Apollo 1 answering the press, six weeks before the fire in the chamber itself that can look in the hatch and monitor what's going on. ▸ A television camera in the chamber, looking in through the hatch It can look in when a door is off. This is shot in through the door. That's our TV camera that will be on board.

We'll be able to transmit some pictures back live. And this is the end of the test. It was about 12, 14 hours in there. ▸ Twelve to fourteen hours inside ▸ FOUR - WHAT THE CAMERA WAS FOR Will it be stowed or mounted during the launch or powered phase of the flight, what ▸ Inside spacecraft 012.

The labels in frame read TV CAMERA ATTACH. do you propose to really use it for? Well, we call a TV camera Chaffee's Folly, so I'll let him talk to you about it. See, I'm looking out for you guys all the time.

▸ Three camera mounts: the display panel, above the couches, and the lower bay We have three mounts in the spacecraft, one that can mount the camera and look at the main display panel, one that mounts up and up above us when we're laying in the couches so it's looking at us and then the other one down in the lower equipment bay that scans the work area of the environmental control station where we change our ▸ "the environmental control station, where we change our lithium hydroxide canisters" lithium hydroxide canisters and our program coverage that we will try to meet if it's at all possible will include some of the onboard tasks like changing a lithium ▸ The Board later placed the most likely start of the fire under the lithium hydroxide access door hydroxide canister manually controlling some of the ECU valves. We hope to have some TV coverage during one of the burns and then the possibly the ▸ Its finding names where control-system wiring enters the space separation maneuver. You can hand -hold it or you can mount it in any one of the ▸ between the Environmental Control Unit and the oxygen panel ▸ He was saying where a camera would look three stations and I'm sure when it's handheld we'll all be taking our turns hand -holding it. Do us a favor and let us know who is manipulating the camera at times when you were feeding those pictures to us, so we have some idea.

Who's who among those layers? Who's the producer, huh? That's surprising Roy, I don't recall ever having a cameraman credited, it's always you or your contemporaries. We haven't had such distinguished cameramen before, Roger.

Only one thing more, Roger, will the camera be mounted or stowed during the powered phase of flight. ▸ FIVE - FIVE MINUTES WITH A HALF-INCH HOLE It will be stowed during the powered phase of flight. That contradicts what we were told this morning, and that's why I wanted to clarify the point. Jeff Thompson.

We understand that the oxygen sump tank can hold pressure ▸ A reporter asks how long the oxygen sump tank holds pressure if the cabin is holed in case of rapid decompression for a number of minutes. Are you going to be doing a speed test in donning the suit that last time? And who's the champ at the moment on that? No, we don't plan to do any speed tests to put the suits on.

We have practice putting them on in the simulator and we found it works best if the three of you work together and work at certain times in certain areas and help each other. What is the duration of time that you have with that sump tank? Oh, the order of five to seven minutes. Well, you mean the time in the sump tank?

Yes. Well, it takes us about five to seven minutes to get our suits completely on. ▸ Five to seven minutes to get the suits completely on The duration depends on the size of the hole, and I think it's a five -minute, yeah, five minutes with a half -inch hole is what it's guaranteed. ▸ "five minutes with a half inch hole is what it's guaranteed" ▸ SIX - PROBABLY NO RIGHT NOW ▸ Press day at Launch Complex 34 — the pad Mark Bloom.

Well first I'd like to hear from Ed White about the the elastic trousers and second Gus Christen mentioned earlier that you hadn't done certain training in station keeping with the S4B. I'd like to know if if the spacecraft were ready now ▸ "if the spacecraft were ready now, would you gentlemen be ready to go up with it?" would you gentlemen be ready to go up with it? I think I'd have to say probably no right now we've still got some more training ▸ "I think I'd have to say, probably no right now" that we want to do, would certainly like to do. ▸ SEVEN - A SUCCESS IF ALL THREE OF US GET BACK ▸ The question is what the shortest flight would be that still counted Oh, I think that's a pretty difficult answer.

We like as much time as we can get, and any time we get, why, it will certainly give us some information. I'm sure that after we get up over a day or so, why we will feel that we have a great deal of information on the systems. Some of the thermal properties, of course, takes days to really come to equilibrium, and the longer we can keep it up, the better off we are. I don't think I would care to amplify that.

It's typical of a long -duration flight. ▸ Thermal equilibrium takes days. Consumables. The first day.

The more time you get, the more stability and equilibrium, as far as thermal properties go, the utilization of consumables, these are the things we need to know about. I'd suspect after one day that we'd probably feel we'd succeeded in getting most of the mission accomplished. Well, would either of you say that, say a three orbit, three revolution flight, would that be enough to give you a general idea or would you think, would a day actually be the minimum? I think probably Joe Shea as a program manager is the guy ▸ Joe Shea, the programme manager, would be the one to decide that's going to have to decide what really makes it a successful mission.

I don't think we're really capable of answering that one. You know, as far as we're concerned, it's a success if all three of us get back. ▸ "As far as we're concerned, it's a success if all three of us get back" Sanders from on. ▸ EIGHT - THE STARS Well, Ed's our big navigator.

I'll let him tell you about it. ▸ The sextant and the telescope. A man's eye at the optics. Well, actually one of the big milestones I think will be when we get up there and ▸ Popping the covers off the sextant telescope pop the covers off of the sextant telescope and get an idea of exactly what we can or can't see through there and if we have any coding or any problems with coding on our optics how hard it will be to acquire the star star in the sextant, if we can ▸ and finding out how hard it is to acquire a star see them adequately in the telescope and we are all capable of easy navigation, in other words, moving around with the stars up in the sky, so if we can see out through the telescope, I have full confidence that we can easily acquire and market in the sextant.

And as far as the last question is concerned of how well we can see ▸ Ten flights of saying you cannot see stars in the daytime stars in the daytime, we've come back after ten flights now and steadily maintain that we can't see stars in the daytime. We have one additional aid on this flight. We have the capability with the guidance and navigation system to put it in optics, ▸ Still the same recording - Grissom, White and Chaffee, six weeks before the fire auto optics positioning, which can automatically select a star, put it in the center of the telescope, and it should put it also in the center of the sextant. And the sextant has a magnification factor in it, which should permit us to see the stars in the daytime.

So we feel that if our optics isn't degraded, that we will be ▸ The navigation trainer at Houston able to, at least through the auto -optics positioning, put a star in the sextant and mark it in the sextant in the daytime. ▸ Autooptics can put a star in the centre of the telescope by itself Now, this doesn't give us a full capability that we would really like to have of being able to see the field of stars in the telescope in the daytime, which theoretically, if you didn't have problems due to reflected light on your lenses and whatnot, you theoretically should be able to do this from space. But with the problems of reflections and whatnot, I don't believe we will without magnification. Ed, you might want to add to that that in order for this auto -optics to work, you just can't do this at random.

▸ But only if the platform was aligned hours before. From scratch you have to see the stars yourself. This assumes that we have previously aligned the maybe six or seven hours before, and we're doing a realignment because of drift, but if you're starting from scratch you can't use this auto -optics positioning. We have to be able to see the stars to make the initial alignment through the telescope.

▸ NINE - NO-GO ITEMS Art Hill. Yesterday we got a rundown from Joe Shea on some of the problems that have ▸ The question: have the problems in the spacecraft's development led up to the development cycle of the spacecraft, and I was wondering if any of the ▸ changed how you will test the systems in flight? problems have led to changes in the testing procedures that you will follow in checking out these various systems like the ECS in orbit during the flight. Did you hear all the questions?

We were talking out there while you said that. Would you repeat it? Problems like the ECS that have come up in the development of the spacecraft, have any of these problems led to changes in your testing procedures ▸ The question has to be repeated that you will use to check out this various equipment while you're in flight? I can't think of any write -off.

Can you? In the environmental control system, the suit evaporator is probably the ▸ The suit evaporator is named only one. We probably won't play around too much with the suit evaporator unless we need to use it. I think there's another answer to that, and that was that we had problems that were basically no -go problems.

▸ "we had problems that were basically no-go problems" And when those are solved, that shouldn't change our testing procedure, really testing the whole package as we intended to do all along. Let's get this gentleman back here. Yesterday we had a briefing on the computer display panel, and it seemed to be quite a few numbers that had to be translated into words. Do you think the human engineers could have done you any better service on that?

▸ TEN - A LANGUAGE OF NUMBERS Well, Don's been punching that thing lately. ▸ The computer keyboard Let's let him talk about it a little while. Well, it's true you have to learn a language of numbers to operate that thing. ▸ "it's true you have to learn a language of numbers to operate that thing" I don't know of any way that you could human engineer it appreciably to make it any more meaningful.

You have to use it. It's strictly a checklist operation. You have to sit there and know that certain combinations of what are called verbs ▸ Verbs and nouns — each of them actually a two-digit number and nouns, which are actually two -digit numbers, but we call them verbs and nouns, mean certain real words in English. And aside from perhaps rearranging a number so that you would go from left to right and up to down rather than the other way around on the keyboard, that'd be about the only thing I know of that would make it any simpler to operate.

What about the set of words instead of numbers? ▸ A reporter asks why it cannot use words Words instead of numbers? Yes, sir. One more level of logic to bring you back to English.

Well, I think that would, if you tried to deal with actual words, that you mean it in the sense of punching in letters of the alphabet rather than Well, mainly for when it's talking to you. This seems to be the hard part. Oh, we have a limited capacity. ▸ Because the memory to hold them does not exist I don't think there's a capacity in the computer to do that.

Yeah, we have a limited capacity in the computer now, and we're just overcrowded. To get the same amount of mathematics in the given volume and bulk, you'd have to Well, I don't know how you would do it. We've got a certain number of words, and we can do a large number of different programs with these. If you wanted to put things in actual word readouts, you'd have to have a tremendously increased memory in the community.

▸ ELEVEN - TEN WEEKS, OVERNIGHT failures in monitoring it are all over on his side, so the system's monitoring is primarily all done on the right side. For Shira Isley in Cunningham, if I may, has the changeover from 205 to 204 ▸ The backup crew had been moved from spacecraft 205 to 204 generated any training problems for you in catching up to this complicated flight plan that we've been talking of, and what will you three be doing on launch day? I'll start, and then we'll bounce down the line then. First off, 205 was quite similar to 204, and as we saw the schedule changing, 205 became almost identical to 204.

The spacecraft were almost mirror images. ▸ The two spacecraft were almost mirror images The only difference in our preparation and the 204 prime crew's preparation at that point in time was about six weeks to two months. ▸ The gap in preparation was six weeks to two months We're trying to narrow that gap as we progress as backups. Now, the period of time at the Cape would be the same role as backups where we would be prepared up to a certain point of time to take the mission either individually or ▸ A NASA recording of the Apollo 1 crew and the reporters, six weeks before the fire as a crew, and then finally we would be preparing the spacecraft and would ultimately have to have an operational decision on when we could make the mission, if that were required.

Well, I think our job really is two parts. One is to prepare ourselves to fly this mission in case we're called upon. The other part is to support the prime crew in whatever they need. As far as our learning to fly it in this short a time, we have been scrambling quite a bit lately trying to get caught up on a lot of simulator time mainly that we need in order to get up to speed on the guidance system and other systems.

As far as our support role, I think that the work we did on 205 prepared us very well to slide into that very easily because of the similarity between the two vehicles. I can only reiterate that the problems associated with suddenly being ▸ "the problems associated with suddenly being dropped on 204 dropped on 204 are those associated with having overnight about ten weeks to make ▸ are those associated with having overnight about ten weeks to make up" up, eight weeks to make up, and it isn't all necessarily a disadvantage when you stop and figure that there would also been a lot of lost motion maybe in our training over those ten weeks and we've suddenly lost all that lost motion too and you have new direction made at your efforts it's pretty well laid out what you have to do I think it's also a fairly safe assumption that by launch day we might not necessarily have made up a full eight or ten weeks but we will have done our best to be at that point as well prepared as we could. ▸ By launch day they might not have made up a full eight or ten weeks Louis Alexander. On the last 14 day flight Borman and level brought along some reading material.

Do you folks have any plans to bring along some reading? ▸ The same session. Six weeks later all three of the prime crew were dead. That's a 200 -page book all by itself.

You might compare the missions by starting to stack up the volumes of data that are required. We have not only those volumes, but we have the logging volumes, the flight plan, and the The targets that we'll use to, for our Apollo landmarks, we have our, well it actually progressed the same way in Gemini as we started through, eventually as the flights got longer and more complex, the amount of material that you carried on board increased. So I think we'll have quite a bit to read. It's gotten to the point we need a librarian instead of an engineer.

▸ "It's gotten to the point we need a librarian instead of an engineer" Cross index. Well, how do you plan to relax, then, or does things get kind of tense? ▸ A reporter: how do you plan to relax, then? Does things get kind of tense?

▸ "I don't think I can answer that one" I don't think I can answer that one. ▸ TWELVE - AN OPERATIONAL DECISION I believe, Wally, you said that you're prepared to back up the prime crew ▸ Could one crew member be exchanged, rather than swapping whole crews? individually or as a backup crew. Do I understand that there's any possible change in policy that now we would be prepared to exchange individual crew members rather than swap entire crews if one or the other set of crews is incapacitated?

No, I said what you said, but I added to that this would be an operational decision depending on the conditions at the time. ▸ "we've never had a position that says you would change whole crews" We've never had a position that says you would change whole crews. We've always maintained operational flexibility to go either way, and you'd make ▸ "you'd make that decision when you determine what's happened to you" that decision when you determine what's happened to you and where you are in a mission. I think it's not fair to take the precedent.

Obviously in Mercury you can only replace one man. In Germany, you had to replace either two or one men, and we're matriculating with three men now, so you have to give us an out on that one. ▸ THIRTEEN - THE LAST QUESTION I think the decision that was made to remove the 205 mission as originally conceived ▸ The last exchange of the session was one that we concurred in. Go ahead, Gary.

Dick, I wanted to follow up on Sue's question a moment ago on your philosophy here where you have three members in a backup team. ▸ Gemini 9 is raised: both prime crew members were lost, and a full crew had to be substituted You have no ironclad policy if one of the primary crew members becomes sick or something that you would replace a prime crew with the backup crew totally or if you would run one person in, is that correct? That's correct, we do not. The time we did it in Gemini was with nine and we lost ▸ The end of the same recording, about six weeks before the fire both prime crew members so it was an obvious choice there, we had to replace it with a full crew.

If we'd lost one, we'd have to make an operational decision at that point as to which was the best way to go. Well, could you elaborate on your thinking of using a team, the team effort? I speak in the sense that one crew gets used to working and training and doing things a certain way. And if you lose one and you have to shove a member from the backup team in there, don't you have sort of a cog that doesn't quite fit after nine months of training?

It's possible. That's why I say it's a function of one. You have to make this kind of a decision. ▸ "if you got down the line, say, two weeks before launch, So if you got down the line, say, two weeks before launch and something happened to ▸ and something happened to the primary crew ...

the primary crew, then you're thinking, not trying to pin you down, but would be ▸ ... would be leaning probably toward replacing the whole crew, would it not?" leaning probably toward replacing the whole crew, would it not? Probably. Okay, Mr.

Slayton has about a five minute film he'd like for you to see, ▸ "Probably." ▸ Then Slayton wound up the session with a film so let's wind up this session with that film. ▸ FOURTEEN - 27 JANUARY 1967 Six weeks later, the spacecraft was on launch complex 34, stacked on its rocket for a test that did not involve fuel. Power was applied at 5 to 1 in the afternoon, Greenwich time. Grissom entered the command module at 6 in the evening, Greenwich followed by Chaffee and White.

He reported an odor in the suit oxygen loop. The count was held while a sample was taken. Analysis afterwards determined that the odor had nothing to do with the fire. The count resumed at 1942 with the hatches going on and the cabin was purged with oxygen from 1945.

The cabin was at 16 .7 pounds per square inch absolute and it was pure oxygen. The board's determination on that is four words long. The test conditions were extremely hazardous. ▸ The plugs-out test.

No fuel in the launch vehicle. ▸ One stated purpose: to verify emergency escape without help, ▸ at the conclusion of the test ▸ A microphone in the spacecraft was live and could not be turned off ▸ The count was held at ten minutes while the fault was hunted ▸ None of the communication problems had a direct bearing on the fire ▸ 16.7 psia · 100 per cent oxygen ▸ "The test conditions were extremely hazardous" ▸ FIFTEEN - FIFTEEN SECONDS At 55 seconds past 2330, the records show a surge on one of the alternating current buses. Nine seconds after that, the crew reported a fire in the command module. The board does not print what they said.

It writes that the crew gave the first verbal indication of an emergency. We have not obtained that recording, so this film does not supply the words. The fire ran along the nets, rigged under the equipment bays to catch anything that fell, and along the Velcro, and it threw burning nylon as it went. Twelve seconds after the report, the last transmission from the spacecraft began.

Two seconds after that, the hull gave way, at a pressure of at least 29 pounds, against a design that allowed for 13 above the air outside. The center couch was white's. The procedure gave him the hatch, harness still buckled. His buckle was found unopened.

▸ 23:30:55 — a voltage transient. AC Bus 2. ▸ 23:31:04.7 — the first verbal indication of an emergency ▸ Fire ran along the Raschel nets rigged to stop items falling ▸ into the equipment bays, and along the Velcro. Molten nylon carried it ▸ 23:31:16.8 — the final crew transmission begins ▸ 23:31:19 — the Command Module ruptures, at least 29 psia ▸ against a hull designed for 13 above the air outside ▸ 23:31:22.4 — all transmission ends ▸ "With a slightly higher pressure inside the Command Module than outside, ▸ opening the inner hatch is impossible because of the resulting force" ▸ The centre couch was White's.

Procedure gave him the hatch. ▸ His buckle was found unopened ▸ SIXTEEN - FIVE MINUTES Outside, on the eighth level, men started for the white room, the enclosure that surrounds the hatch. Then, the module ruptured, and fire came out of it into the level. They went back.

Attempts to get the hatches off began about a minute after the fire was reported. The masks they had were built for poison rather than for smoke, and could not cope with it. Visibility inside was nothing at all. The board's finding is that it was necessary to work essentially by touch.

five men going in and coming back out for air. All three hatches were open about five minutes after the report. ▸ Attempts to remove the hatches began about a minute after the report ▸ The masks were designed for toxic atmospheres, not dense smoke ▸ They could not cope with it ▸ Visibility in the White Room was virtually zero ▸ It was necessary to work essentially by touch ▸ Five men opened the three hatches, each going in and out for air ▸ All three hatches were open about five minutes after the report ▸ Resuscitation was impossible by then ▸ SEVENTEEN - WHAT THE BOARD FOUND, AND WHAT IT ASKED FOR The board sat for three months. It could not say what started the fire.

It named a most probable initiator and a place, and it stopped there. It found no evidence of sabotage. And in the record of how the test came to be written, there is this. this.

▸ "No single ignition source of the fire was conclusively identified" ▸ Most probable: an electrical arc, near where control-system wiring ▸ enters the space between the Environmental Control Unit and the oxygen panel ▸ "No evidence was discovered that suggested sabotage" ▸ "Due to internal pressure, the Command Module inner hatch ▸ could not be opened prior to rupture" ▸ "In September the flight crew requested that emergency egress practice ▸ which was not in the original test outline be added" ▸ The practice was to be run at the conclusion of the test ▸ The test did not reach its conclusion If this was worth your time, the button that helps most is subscribe. Every film on this channel is built from the documents and investigation actually published, and from the recordings that actually exist, and nothing that was never proved is presented here as settled.